AJH: I generated this via the ChatGPT Deep Research tool. Currently, a ChatGPT Plus user ($20/month) can run ten ‘Deep Research’ tasks a month.

I’ll conduct deep research into the current parallels between the U.S. (last 10 years) and pre-WWII Germany, analyzing political, economic, social, and media-related factors. The research will incorporate:

• Factual, data-driven insights from academic sources, government reports, and expert analysis.
• Comparative analysis of pre-WWII Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, post-Soviet Russia, and other relevant historical cases.
• Extrapolation based on historical patterns, expert forecasts, and any available quantitative modeling.

I’ll gather the most relevant findings and let you know when the report is ready.

Parallels Between Contemporary U.S. and Pre-WWII Germany (Weimar)

Introduction

Over the last decade, analysts have increasingly drawn comparisons between political and societal trends in the United States and those of Germany’s Weimar Republic in the years leading up to World War II. While history never repeats exactly, it can “rhyme,” offering cautionary parallels (The U.S. and pre-Nazi Germany: the similarities are growing, and …). This report explores factual, data-driven insights on these parallels across political, economic, social, and media spheres. We also compare the U.S. experience with other historical cases like Mussolini’s interwar Italy and post-Soviet Russia. The analysis relies on academic research, government data, and expert commentary to objectively assess similarities, differences, and what they might portend for the future.

Political Parallels: Polarization and Democratic Erosion

Polarization and Trust in Institutions: The United States has become starkly polarized in recent years, with partisan divides deepening on core values and trust in governance. Public trust in the federal government has hovered near historic lows – since 2007, no more than about 30% of Americans have said they trust Washington to do the right thing most of the time (Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 | Pew Research Center). This erosion of trust is bipartisan but asymmetric: for example, as of 2023 only 11% of Republicans trusted the federal government compared to 35% of Democrats (Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 | Pew Research Center). Weimar Germany similarly suffered collapsing faith in its democratic institutions. Many Germans lost confidence in the Weimar government amid economic turmoil and parliamentary gridlock, contributing to extreme polarization between Communist and Nationalist factions. The political center eroded, and mainstream parties struggled to govern as extremist movements gained support. In both cases, democracy’s guardrails weakened as citizens grew cynical about whether elected leaders could deliver stability. Notably, America’s Economist Democracy Index score has slipped in kind – the U.S. was downgraded from a “full democracy” to a “flawed democracy” in 2016, when its score fell below the threshold due to declining trust and partisan dysfunction (The Economist Democracy Index – Wikipedia). Freedom House and other watchdogs likewise document a measurable democratic backslide in the U.S. over the past decade. Political scientists define this as “democratic erosion” or “backsliding,” an incremental chipping away of norms and institutional checks (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States).

Extremist Rhetoric and Nationalism: Both societies witnessed surges in nationalist, us-versus-them rhetoric in times of distress. In Weimar Germany, radical right-wing groups like the Nazis promoted hyper-nationalism and scapegoated internal enemies (in particular Jews and leftists) for the nation’s problems. Similar patterns are evident in recent U.S. politics. Fringe ideologies have crept toward the mainstream as some political leaders court the far-right. Experts note that former President Trump’s political strategy deliberately mobilized elements of the far-right – including white supremacists, militant nationalists, and conspiracy theorists – making the Republican coalition increasingly dependent on these extremist voters (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America). Nativist and nationalist slogans (“America First”) gained prominence, reflecting a backlash against globalization and multiculturalism. The rise in explicit extremist rhetoric is well documented: federal agencies report that domestic violent extremist groups (often driven by white nationalist or anti-government ideologies) pose a growing threat. FBI and DHS data show domestic terrorism investigations have skyrocketed 357% over the past decade (The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It | U.S. GAO) (The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It | U.S. GAO). This mirrors how Weimar-era militias and paramilitaries grew bolder – for instance, the Nazi Party’s private army (SA “Brownshirts”) openly battled political opponents in the streets, and political violence became endemic. Between 1919 and 1922 alone, right-wing extremists in Germany committed at least 354 political murders, far outpacing violence from the left (Political violence in Germany (1918–1933) – Wikipedia). Today’s U.S. has not seen assassinations on that scale, but it has endured a spike in threats and violent incidents tied to extremist rhetoric (e.g. plots, hate crimes, and armed protests). The throughline is that intense polarization and demonization of opponents can fertilize an extreme political climate in which a democracy’s norms are no longer respected.

Erosion of Democratic Norms: A hallmark warning sign in pre-WWII Germany was the erosion of democratic norms and guardrails, often under the pressure of extremist factions. Weimar institutions were fragile – its constitution allowed rule by emergency decree, which leaders (and ultimately Hitler) exploited to bypass parliament. Over time, the unwritten norms that sustained democracy (like accepting election outcomes, refraining from political violence, and respecting the opposition’s legitimacy) deteriorated. In the contemporary U.S., analysts likewise point to norm-breaking and institutional stress tests in recent years. The contested 2020 presidential election was a vivid example: the incumbent president refused to accept defeat and attempted to overturn the result – an unprecedented challenge to the peaceful transfer of power (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). This culminated in the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol, when a violent mob tried to disrupt Congress’s certification of the vote. Many commentators drew parallels to Adolf Hitler’s failed Beer Hall Putsch of 1923 – another instance of an extremist faction resorting to a coup attempt after fermenting a false narrative of a “betrayed” nation (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America). In Hitler’s case, he used the failed coup and subsequent prison time as a propaganda platform, later gaining power through legal means. Observers worry that January 6 could play a similar galvanizing role for America’s far-right fringe going forward (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America).

Beyond singular events, democratic norms have bent under sustained pressure. Since 2010, dozens of U.S. state legislatures have passed measures that restrict voting access or skew representation – from extreme gerrymandering to voter suppression laws – effectively “gaming” the system rather than competing fairly (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). At the federal level, there have been efforts to undermine the independence of institutions (pressuring law enforcement, defying legislative oversight, purging civil servants deemed disloyal, etc. (Understanding democratic decline in the United States)). These trends echo the Weimar playbook, wherein anti-democratic actors exploit legal avenues to weaken checks and balances from within. Political scientist Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt warn that democracies often die not via sudden coups but through a gradual evisceration by elected autocrats who “maintain a veneer of democracy while eviscerating its substance” (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). We see early signs: norms of mutual toleration have frayed, with partisan rivals increasingly described as enemies or traitors. One survey found that 63% of Republican voters still believe the 2020 election was stolen despite all evidence to the contrary (PRRI) – a false “Big Lie” narrative remarkably reminiscent of Germany’s toxic “stab-in-the-back” myth after World War I (the unfounded claim that internal traitors undermined Germany’s war effort) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America). Such beliefs erode the legitimacy of democracy itself. Taken together, these political factors – polarization, extremist influence, and norm erosion – in the U.S. today bear an unsettling resemblance to conditions that weakened Weimar Germany’s democracy in its final years.

Economic Factors: Inequality, Inflation, and Instability

Wealth Inequality at Historic Highs: Economic distress and inequality set the stage for political radicalization in both interwar Germany and the contemporary United States. In Weimar Germany, the hyperinflation of 1921-1923 wiped out middle-class savings, and the Great Depression beginning in 1929 brought mass unemployment (over 30% by 1932) and misery. These shocks decimated public confidence in the status quo and drove desperate voters toward extremist solutions on the left and right. The U.S. has not experienced a collapse as severe as Germany’s post-WWI hyperinflation or Depression-era joblessness. However, over the past few decades – and continuing in the last 10 years – the U.S. has seen soaring wealth inequality and economic anxieties that some researchers link to populist resentment. Federal Reserve data show that as of late 2021, the top 1% of American households own 30.9% of the nation’s wealth, while the entire bottom 50% owns a mere 2.6% (Wealth inequality in the United States – Wikipedia). Wealth concentration has returned to levels not seen since the late 1920s – the infamous “Gilded Age” decade preceding the 1929 crash. In fact, economists find that the share of wealth held by the richest 0.1% of U.S. families is now almost as high as it was in the 1920s, an era defined by vast fortunes and glaring inequality (Exploding wealth inequality in the United States – Equitable Growth). This mirrors Weimar Germany’s situation in which a small elite held disproportionate wealth while many others struggled with poverty and joblessness, breeding resentment. In the U.S., median wages for workers have stagnated in real terms even as corporate profits and stock markets (benefiting mainly the wealthy) hit record highs. Such a gap between the economic “winners” and “losers” can fuel the appeal of demagogic politics that promise to upend the system. Studies in both Europe and the U.S. have found that regions hit by sharp industrial decline or trade-related job losses show higher support for populist and extremist candidates (Economic Shocks and Populism – Oxford Academic). Economic grievances – whether rooted in reality or perception – become fertile ground for political radicalization when people feel the system is rigged against them.

Inflation and Economic Instability: Inflation, in particular, carries heavy historical baggage in Germany. The Weimar hyperinflation of 1923 famously caused banknotes to become worthless and destabilized the middle class. Later, the global Depression led to deflation and unemployment, but in each case the extreme economic instability discredited moderate politicians and boosted the Nazis’ appeal as they exploited public desperation. The United States in the last 10 years has enjoyed mostly low inflation and steady (if uneven) growth, but the COVID-19 pandemic and its aftermath brought economic shocks that tested public confidence. In 2022, U.S. inflation spiked to 9.1% – the highest 12-month increase in over 40 years (Consumer prices up 9.1 percent over the year ended June 2022 …). While nowhere near Weimar’s runaway prices, this surge in the cost of living strained households and dominated political debate. Polls showed Americans extremely worried about inflation, and some observers noted that periods of rising prices and economic anxiety can create openings for populist messaging (for example, blaming immigrants or global supply chains for hardship). Moreover, although unemployment in the U.S. is currently low, the pandemic in 2020 caused a sudden mass layoff of millions (a short-term 14.8% unemployment rate, the worst since the 1930s). Government stimulus prevented a prolonged depression, but the pandemic’s disruptions added to feelings of instability. The tumult of 2008’s financial crisis (just outside our 10-year window) and the long recovery also looms in the background, having already given rise to anti-establishment movements like Occupy Wall Street on the left and the Tea Party on the right in the early 2010s. Economic distress by itself does not cause authoritarianism – but combined with ineffective governance, it can be a catalyst. In Weimar Germany, the Nazi Party’s electoral fortunes were directly lifted by economic crisis: they were a fringe party with only 2.6% of the vote in 1928 (Electoral success – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools), but after the Depression hit, the Nazis’ share jumped to 18.3% in 1930 and kept rising to a plurality (37% by July 1932) (Electoral success – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools) (Electoral success – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools). Many ordinary Germans who would never have considered the Nazis in better times turned to Hitler’s movement out of economic despair and a desire for radical change. Similarly, analysts argue that segments of the American electorate shaken by deindustrialization, rising costs, or fear of downward mobility have gravitated toward anti-establishment leaders and simplistic solutions. While the U.S. economy remains fundamentally stronger and more diversified than Weimar Germany’s, the persistent wealth gap and periodic shocks have created an undertow of discontent. A Pew survey found a majority of Americans now believe their children will be worse off financially than they were – a stark reversal of the traditional “American Dream” expectation of progress (Exploding wealth inequality in the United States – Equitable Growth). Such pessimism provides a receptive audience for demagogic narratives blaming scapegoats for economic woes.

Economic Anxiety and Radicalization: A key parallel is how economic turmoil can fuel political radicalization and weaken democratic consensus. In Germany’s case, extreme economic hardship discredited the moderate parties that had signed the Versailles Treaty and managed Weimar’s economy. Nazis and Communists both gained votes by promising to restore prosperity and national pride by dramatic means (tearing up reparations, smashing “Jewish finance,” or overthrowing capitalism altogether). In the U.S., prolonged economic inequality has likewise eroded faith that the standard political process will address ordinary people’s concerns. Populist candidates have tapped into anger over factory closures, wage stagnation, and the feeling that elites (on Wall Street or in Washington) enriched themselves at the public’s expense after crises like 2008. While the U.S. has not seen anything like the Nazi or Communist parties, there has been a marked rise in anti-system sentiment: more Americans now favor major changes to the economic and political system than in past decades, and some are drawn to far-right or far-left rhetoric promising sweeping change. Notably, populist movements often channel economic frustration into cultural or identity grievances – for example, blaming immigrants or minority groups for “taking jobs” or straining public resources. This overlaps with the social dynamics discussed below. The historical lesson is that severe or unresolved economic problems can act as a force multiplier for extremists. As one Foreign Policy analysis bluntly put it, we cannot know how a shock on the scale of 1929’s Great Depression would play out in today’s America – “Would the 70 million people who voted for Trump be radicalized even further?” (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America). The hope is that robust institutions and social safety nets can mitigate economic pain before it transmutes into political upheaval. But the combination of record inequality, segments of society feeling left behind, and bouts of instability (like sudden inflation) is a parallel worth heeding.

Social Dynamics: Public Sentiment, Scapegoating, and Unrest

Public Disillusionment and Fear: Social cohesion frayed in both pre-Nazi Germany and contemporary America as large segments of the population came to feel disillusioned and threatened. In Weimar Germany, humiliation from World War I (the “stab-in-the-back” myth blaming traitors for the defeat), combined with economic trauma, fostered a pervasive sense of national grievance. Many Germans felt their way of life was under siege – whether from vindictive foreign powers, communist revolutionaries, or ethnic “others” – and that feeling was skillfully amplified by extremist propaganda. In the U.S., polls over the past decade have consistently found a majority saying the country is on the “wrong track,” reflecting deep pessimism. Social surveys show Americans increasingly distrust not only government but also each other. Partisan and cultural divides (urban vs. rural, liberal vs. conservative, etc.) have widened, and people segregate into like-minded communities both in real life and online. A striking data point: by 2020, political scientists coding U.S. political competition in the Polity index downgraded it to “factional” – meaning major parties view each other as existential enemies rather than loyal opposition (index). This shift dropped the U.S. into a risk zone for instability according to the Political Instability Task Force models (index). It echoes the factional atmosphere of late Weimar, when the political discourse became zero-sum and demonizing the other side as enemies of the people. Social media echo chambers today can intensify this effect, reinforcing one’s worst fears about opponents. All of this contributes to a public mood in the U.S. that some commentators compare to Weimar’s “sense of crisis and fear” (Why People Should Stop Comparing the U.S. to Weimar Germany). A 2022 survey, for instance, found that around two-thirds of Americans across party lines believe democracy is at risk of collapse. Fear for the nation’s future – once an almost unthinkable sentiment in the stable postwar U.S. – is now mainstream, much as Germans in the early 1930s feared their nation was collapsing, priming them to accept radical measures.

Scapegoating and Hate Campaigns: A dangerous social parallel is the targeting of minority groups as scapegoats for a nation’s troubles. The Nazi regime is history’s prime example of scapegoating: Hitler relentlessly blamed Germany’s woes on Jews, Marxists, and other marginalized groups, using propaganda to turn large portions of the population against those communities. This culminated in horrific violence. While the scale and explicit nature of Nazi racial ideology is unparalleled, the United States has seen an alarming resurgence of scapegoating rhetoric and hate crimes against various minority groups in recent years. Immigrants, racial minorities, religious minorities, and LGBTQ+ people have all been vilified in certain political narratives – often being blamed (without evidence) for economic problems, crime, or cultural “decline.” The impact is evident in hard data. Reported hate crime incidents in the U.S. rose to their highest level in 12 years in 2020, according to FBI statistics (FBI Reports Hate Crimes at Highest Level in 12 Years), and then increased a further 11.6% in 2021 (US hate crimes continued alarming rise in 2021, FBI data shows). The Anti-Defamation League, which tracks antisemitism, recorded over 3,600 antisemitic incidents in 2022 – the highest number ever since it began monitoring in 1979 (U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says | Reuters). That was the third spike to record highs in the past five years (U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says | Reuters). Acts of harassment, vandalism, and violence against Jewish Americans – including brazen public displays of Nazi symbols by extremists – have surged (U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says | Reuters) (U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says | Reuters). Similarly, anti-Asian hate crimes jumped significantly (by 70% from 2019 to 2020) amid xenophobic scapegoating during the COVID pandemic (FBI Reports Hate Crimes at Highest Level in 12 Years) (FBI Reports Hate Crimes at Highest Level in 12 Years). These trends suggest that the social fabric is under strain, with demagogic messaging finding an audience. For example, the conspiracy theory movement QAnon revived classic antisemitic tropes about a secret cabal of global elites, leading to real-world harassment. Anti-immigrant rhetoric – painting migrants as invaders or criminals – became a staple in certain media and political circles, coinciding with hardline policies and a hostile climate for immigrants. Weimar Germany’s media was rife with caricatures of Jews as profiteers or Bolsheviks sabotaging the nation; disturbingly, one can find analogous demonizing caricatures in some American discourse (such as portraying Muslim Americans as terrorist sympathizers, immigrants as disease carriers, or political opponents as traitors). The scapegoated groups differ, but the mechanism is parallel: blame a vulnerable “Other” for complex societal problems to unite the in-group in anger. This serves to divert frustration away from leaders and policies, focusing it instead on target populations. The danger, as history shows, is that normalized scapegoating can escalate from verbal attacks to legal discrimination and even violence.

Civil Unrest and Rising Violence: Both societies experienced a rise in civil unrest and politically motivated violence as polarization deepened. In Weimar Germany, the late 1920s and early 1930s were marked by frequent riots, street brawls between Nazi Brownshirts and Communist Red Front fighters, assassinations of politicians, and even attempted coups. Normal politics was increasingly overshadowed by battles in the streets. The United States, despite its stronger rule-of-law tradition, has seen an uptick in political unrest and sporadic violence in the past decade. High-profile incidents include armed standoffs (such as the Bundy ranch confrontation in 2014), violent clashes at protests (e.g. the Charlottesville white nationalist rally in 2017, where an extremist murdered a counterprotester), and mass shootings targeting specific communities (for instance, the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooting or the 2019 El Paso shooting aimed at Hispanics). The summer of 2020 saw the largest mass protests in U.S. history in response to racial injustice – overwhelmingly peaceful but occasionally erupting into riots or met with heavy-handed crackdowns in some cities. On the opposite end, right-wing militias and self-styled “patriots” staged armed demonstrations against COVID lockdowns in 2020. All of this reflects a society grappling with intense discord and a willingness by some to resort to force. Federal data confirms the broad increase in domestic violent incidents: according to the GAO, all but 8 U.S. states saw at least one incident of domestic terrorism from 2010–2021, and the number of FBI/DHS domestic terror investigations grew by 357% over that period (The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It | U.S. GAO) (The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It | U.S. GAO). The Capitol riot of January 6, 2021 stands out as a moment of unprecedented political violence in modern American history – not since 1814 had the seat of U.S. government been overrun. Scholars note eerie parallels to the street violence of the Weimar era, where militant factions attempted to intimidate legislators and overturn election results by force (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America). The fact that American elected officials today routinely receive death threats and require security details is another sign of this shift – political disagreements increasingly carry the menace of violence. Weimar politicians in their day also faced constant threats; several moderate legislators were assassinated by extremists (e.g. Foreign Minister Walther Rathenau in 1922 was murdered by far-right nationalists). The U.S. thankfully has not seen comparable high-profile assassinations in recent years, but the foiled plot to kidnap Michigan’s governor in 2020, for example, shows that violent conspiracies against officials are a real concern. The common thread is that as social and political divisions sharpen, a subset of the populace embraces violence as legitimate political expression – a grave harbinger for democracy. Both Weimar Germany and the U.S. experienced this phenomenon, albeit to different degrees, underlining the importance of strong legal and societal norms against political violence.

Propaganda, Disinformation, and Social Division: Propaganda and the spread of disinformation play a critical role in shaping social dynamics and enabling the extremes to gain ground. Nazi Germany under Goebbels perfected state propaganda, but even before taking power the Nazis skillfully used mass media (rallies, radio, newspapers, posters) to stoke public anger and direct it at chosen scapegoats. They propagated the “Big Lie” – repeating outrageous falsehoods until many accepted them as truth. In today’s United States, propaganda is not centrally controlled by the state, yet the information ecosystem has in some ways become equally conducive to mass disinformation. The advent of social media and partisan news has created parallel realities for different segments of society. Misinformation spreads at lightning speed online: a 2018 MIT study found that false news stories are 70% more likely to be retweeted than true ones, and they spread “farther, faster, deeper” especially in the political context (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan) (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan). In other words, lies can now outrun the truth by a wide margin, reaching millions before fact-checkers can respond. This dynamic has enabled the proliferation of conspiracy theories and propaganda narratives in U.S. social discourse. One glaring example is the pervasive belief among many Americans in the baseless claim that the 2020 election was marred by widespread fraud – a claim repeated in certain media and by political figures despite complete lack of evidence. Surveys showed roughly one-third of Americans (and two-thirds of Republicans) believed the election was stolen (PRRI), essentially a modern Big Lie. Similar to Weimar’s “Dolchstoss” legend, such misinformation serves to delegitimize democratic processes and inflame social grievances. The media landscape is central here and will be examined in the next section, but its social impact is clear: when different groups of citizens live in entirely different information worlds, it undermines the shared reality needed to resolve conflicts through democratic debate. Propaganda can also dehumanize targeted groups – Nazi media portrayed Jews in grotesque, sub-human terms; comparably, some extremist online spaces in the U.S. circulate memes and lies that portray political opponents or minority groups as evil, subverting empathy and justifying hatred. This toxic information climate contributes to radicalizing individuals. For instance, several perpetrators of recent domestic terror attacks (like the Buffalo shooter in 2022) were found to have been influenced by online extremist propaganda (the so-called “Great Replacement” theory about immigrants). In summary, both Weimar Germany and the current U.S. illustrate how propaganda and disinformation can exacerbate social divisions and set the stage for democratic collapse, by convincing a significant portion of the public to reject compromise, embrace prejudice, or even condone violence based on false narratives.

Media Landscape: Propaganda and Control of the Narrative

Weimar and Nazi Propaganda: The interwar German media environment went from a relatively open, pluralistic press in the Weimar years to a tightly controlled propaganda machine once the Nazis seized power in 1933. During Weimar, Germany had a vibrant but highly polarized press – newspapers were often aligned with political factions, and extremist voices like the Nazi paper Völkischer Beobachter spewed incendiary content. Radio was a new mass medium in the 1920s, and the Nazis quickly recognized its potential; after 1933, Joseph Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda took over broadcasting and the press, enforcing a one-party narrative. Dissenting newspapers were shut down, opposition voices silenced, and the regime flooded public space with its messaging. “Fake news” in the Nazi context often meant scapegoating propaganda (e.g. fabricated tales of Jewish conspiracies) that went unchallenged due to censorship. The result was a populace increasingly sealed in an echo chamber of regime-approved information, which smoothed the way for extreme policies.

Modern U.S. Media Fragmentation: In the United States, the media landscape over the last decade has become highly fragmented and partisan, enabling sophisticated propaganda and misinformation campaigns even without centralized state control. The rise of cable news and talk radio had already introduced partisan slants in previous decades, but the explosion of social media and online outlets in the 2010s radically changed information consumption. Many Americans now self-select into media “bubbles” aligned with their political identities – for example, conservatives tuning in primarily to right-leaning TV networks and Facebook groups, liberals to left-leaning outlets and Twitter feeds. As a consequence, there is little common narrative or trusted central source of facts. Trust in mainstream media has plummeted to record lows: only 31% of Americans say they have a great deal or fair amount of trust in mass media to report news accurately (Americans’ Trust in Media Remains at Trend Low – Gallup News). This skepticism creates fertile ground for alternative media and conspiracy peddlers to fill the void. Indeed, the internet is rife with disinformation that can gain as much traction as legitimate news. A striking feature is how some political actors in the U.S. have learned to weaponize the media environment to their advantage. Declaring any unfavorable coverage “fake news” (a phrase popularized in recent years) serves to discredit independent journalism and steer followers toward partisan sources. This echoes authoritarian tactics – as noted by one research center, “controlled ‘facts’ and misinformation are the principal tools of autocratic authority.” (index)Authoritarians from Hitler to Putin have sought to control the narrative; in the U.S., while the government does not control media, partisan ecosystem control can be achieved de facto. For instance, during the Trump presidency, one could observe a feedback loop between the White House and friendly media outlets perpetuating certain false narratives (such as downplaying the pandemic or alleging voter fraud). The recent example of a major news network having to pay a $787 million legal settlement for knowingly spreading false claims about election fraud highlights how misinformation can be propagated even by leading media organizations (How election lies, libel law were key to Fox defamation suit | AP News). Social media algorithms further amplify sensational or extreme content because it drives engagement – a phenomenon that inadvertently favors propaganda and fake news. The MIT study cited earlier demonstrated that false political news spreads farther and faster than truth online because human users are more inclined to share it impulsively (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan) (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan). In other words, the structure of modern media inadvertently rewards the same “Big Lie” techniques that Goebbels would recognize – repeat a provocative falsehood often enough and it can overshadow reality.

Misinformation and Public Opinion: The consequences of this media environment are evident in public opinion distortions. Large portions of the U.S. public believe demonstrably false things (from conspiracy theories like QAnon to myths about vaccines or election results) due to the echo chambers and propaganda-like messaging they consume. The persistence of the 2020 election “stolen” narrative is a case in point – it has been propagated by certain media and political figures so relentlessly that factual refutations have limited effect. In Weimar Germany, Nazi propaganda successfully convinced many Germans that Jews were to blame for both World War I defeat and the Depression; in the U.S., while the targets are different, similar patterns of convincing people to blame out-groups through relentless messaging can be observed. Another parallel is how both Nazi and some modern propagandists cast the press itself as an enemy. Hitler referred to the Weimar press (especially liberal or Jewish-owned papers) as the “lügenpresse” (lying press), undermining people’s trust in independent reporting. In recent years, American journalists have likewise been branded “enemies of the people” by some politicians, and surveys show public confidence in the press is deeply polarized along partisan lines. By discrediting mainstream media, propagandists steer audiences to rely only on their approved sources – a classic tactic to control the narrative. The U.S. doesn’t have formal censorship, but we see de facto information control in segments of society where a single news source or online community dominates what is considered true. The result is that Americans do not share a single reality; for instance, one study noted that during key events like elections or the pandemic, the amount of false or misleading information circulating on social platforms spiked dramatically (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan) (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan), and different communities believed entirely different stories about what was happening. This undermines the possibility of rational consensus and increases susceptibility to demagogic leadership – just as it did in Germany when the Nazis fed the public an alternate reality about who was responsible for their problems.

Resilience and Differences: It’s important to note that the U.S. still retains a pluralistic and largely free press environment – independent and investigative journalism continues, and courts uphold First Amendment protections. This is a key difference from Nazi Germany, where after 1933 no free press remained. Thus, corrective information and opposition voices can still reach the public in America, whereas Germans after 1933 had virtually no access to uncensored information. However, the challenge is that the audience for objective reporting may ignore or disbelieve it if they’ve been conditioned by years of propaganda to distrust anything outside their bubble. The existence of robust media outlets and tech platforms also means counter-speech and fact-checking are possible at scale (e.g. false claims can be debunked in real-time). In Weimar, the state did not have the sophisticated mass communication monitoring we have now, so propaganda often went unchallenged. In today’s U.S., civil society and even some tech companies are attempting to flag or limit the reach of blatant misinformation. The effectiveness of these efforts is mixed, but they provide some bulwark that Weimar lacked. Nonetheless, the media parallels – the use of propaganda to deepen social cleavages, the flooding of the zone with misinformation, and attempts to delegitimize independent journalism – are a serious concern. They highlight that controlling the narrative, whether through state power or network power, is a pivotal step in the erosion of democracy.

Comparative Cases: Mussolini’s Italy, Post-Soviet Russia, and Others

Looking beyond Germany, history offers additional parallels that shed light on how democracies can deteriorate under similar pressures. Two instructive cases are Fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini and post-Soviet Russia under Vladimir Putin. Each illustrates a path from relative democracy or openness to authoritarian rule, driven by factors comparable to those in Germany and potentially relevant to the U.S. context.

Mussolini’s Italy (1920s): Italy emerged from World War I on the winning side but was internally destabilized by economic crisis, social conflict, and disappointment with the peace settlements. In the early 1920s, Italy’s democracy was fragile and polarized between a growing socialist movement on one side and nationalist, reactionary forces on the other – not unlike the left-right polarization of Weimar Germany. Benito Mussolini, a former socialist turned ultra-nationalist, capitalized on the chaos. He formed the Fascist Party with a platform of intense nationalism, authoritarian order, and anti-Communism. Mussolini’s Blackshirt militias engaged in organized violence against leftist opponents, beating and even killing socialist organizers and burning union offices (Benito Mussolini – Fascism, Italy, WW2 | Britannica) (Benito Mussolini – Fascism, Italy, WW2 | Britannica). Many in the Italian middle and upper classes supported or tolerated this violence, fearing a Bolshevik revolution after seeing communist uprisings in Germany and Russia. This dynamic – using fear of a leftist threat to justify right-wing authoritarian measures – has echoes in other countries. In Germany, similarly, conservative elites eventually allied with Hitler largely because they feared communism more than fascism. In October 1922, Mussolini’s followers staged the March on Rome, an intimidation show of force that led Italy’s king to invite Mussolini to form a government rather than risk civil war (How Mussolini Seized Power in Italy—And Turned It Into a Fascist State | HISTORY). Once in power, Mussolini proceeded to dismantle Italy’s democracy from within. By the mid-1920s, he had outlawed opposition parties, free unions, and a free press – replacing Italy’s multi-party democracy with a one-party fascist dictatorship (Benito Mussolini – Fascism, Italy, WW2 | Britannica). “Free speech was crushed” (Benito Mussolini – Fascism, Italy, WW2 | Britannica), and a cult of personality formed around “Il Duce.” The Italian case shows how quickly a constitutional democracy (Italy had elections and a parliament in the early 1920s) can slide into autocracy under the pressure of polarization, violence, and weak institutions. The U.S. has a much longer democratic tradition and stronger institutional checks, but even so, some analysts have raised concerns about a “slow March on Washington” in a figurative sense – meaning a gradual normalization of anti-democratic tactics. The way some militant groups in the U.S. invoke the threat of “socialist” opponents or “antifa” to justify extralegal actions is reminiscent of how Italian Fascists demonized socialists to legitimize violence (How Mussolini Seized Power in Italy—And Turned It Into a Fascist State | HISTORY). The Italian parallel also underscores the role of conservative establishment figures in enabling authoritarianism: Italy’s monarch and liberal politicians underestimated Mussolini and thought they could control him, only to find they had opened the door to dictatorship. This is analogous to how certain establishment conservatives in Weimar (and arguably some in the U.S.) believed they could harness extreme populist leaders for their own ends – a gamble that proved “fatal” in Weimar’s case (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) and could be dangerous in any democracy.

Post-Soviet Russia (2000s): Russia’s experience after the fall of communism is another cautionary tale of democratic backsliding. In the 1990s, Russia attempted to build a democracy and market economy under President Boris Yeltsin. However, the process was chaotic – the economy collapsed, inequality soared with oligarchs capturing wealth, and government authority was weak and corrupt. By the end of the 90s, public hunger for order and stability was intense, much as Germans craved an end to Weimar chaos. Vladimir Putin’s rise starting in 1999 tapped into this sentiment. Although Putin was initially appointed through constitutional means (named acting president by Yeltsin and then winning election), he moved quickly to concentrate power and eliminate checks and balances. Within a few years, Russia’s nascent free media was muzzled – independent TV networks were taken over by the state or shut down. Political opposition was stifled or co-opted, and regional governors lost autonomy. By the late 2000s, Russia had effectively become an autocracy again, with elections that were neither free nor fair. Freedom House’s ratings capture this dramatic shift: Russia went from being rated “Partly Free” in the 1990s to “Not Free” with a score of just 19/100 by 2022 (The torn history between Russia and democracy). That score includes a 5/40 on political rights – near the worst possible (The torn history between Russia and democracy). Michael McFaul, a scholar and former U.S. ambassador to Russia, calls Russia’s democratic collapse from the 1990s to now “one of the most consequential setbacks” in the modern era (Russia’s Road to Autocracy | Journal of Democracy). The drivers of Russia’s backslide are familiar: hyper-centralization of power, rampant corruption blending business and politics (creating an oligarchy loyal to Putin), nationalist propaganda (especially during conflicts like the Chechen wars), and suppression of dissent (jailing or exiling opposition figures). The Russian case parallels Weimar and current U.S. concerns in the sense that democracy was lost not overnight but in a gradual, step-by-step process. Each individual step (censoring a TV station, changing an election law, demonizing critics as “foreign agents”) might not have seemed catastrophic, but cumulatively they ended competitive politics. Another parallel is the use of nationalism and grievance as tools – Putin’s regime cultivated a narrative that the West humiliated Russia in the 1990s and that a strongman was needed to restore national greatness. This resonates with Hitler’s message of avenging Versailles and making Germany great again, and finds some echo in U.S. populist rhetoric about restoring “greatness” or combating globalist humiliation. Of course, the U.S. is still a democracy with robust institutions, whereas Russia’s institutions were very weak post-1991. But Russia demonstrates how even a country that briefly had democratic freedoms can revert to authoritarianism if conditions allow. It underscores that democracy is not guaranteed – without vigilant protection of media freedom, independent courts, and pluralism, a determined leader can undo it. American analysts often point to tactics pioneered by Putin – such as flooding social media with disinformation or leveraging state power to punish critical businesses – as a playbook illiberal politicians elsewhere might try. The U.S. has already seen slivers of this, like calls to “open up libel laws” to intimidate the press or using presidential power to pressure private companies. Russia’s path shows where that can lead if unchecked: today, Russian state media propaganda so dominates the narrative that a large portion of the public believes even outrageous falsehoods (e.g. that Ukraine is run by Nazis, to justify Russia’s war). A democracy’s immune system can be overwhelmed by a sustained assault on truth and institutions, whether in Russia, Germany, or potentially the U.S. if trends continue.

Other Relevant Cases: In addition to Italy and Russia, there are other historical and contemporary examples of democratic erosion that offer insight. For instance, Hungary under Viktor Orbán in the 2010s is often cited as a model of “soft” autocracy emerging within the EU. Orbán’s government used legal means to rewrite the constitution, gerrymander elections, curtail judicial independence, and muzzle independent media, all while maintaining a facade of elections. Hungary went from a democracy to what Orbán openly calls an “illiberal democracy” – Freedom House downgraded Hungary from “Free” to “Partly Free” during his rule. The Hungarian case shows how polarization (urban liberals vs. rural conservatives), nationalism, and corruption enabled an elected leader to entrench himself, a scenario some fear could happen in other democracies. Turkey under Erdoğan followed a somewhat similar trajectory: elected in a democratic system, Erdoğan gradually purged the military and civil service, jailed journalists, and now effectively rules as a strongman with many opposition leaders imprisoned. These examples underscore the pattern of incremental usurpation of power and are cautionary parallels for any democracy experiencing polarization and strongman appeals. They also highlight the role of crises – Orbán took advantage of a migrant crisis; Erdoğan capitalized on a failed coup attempt – just as Hitler exploited the Reichstag Fire. A crisis can serve as a pretext for emergency powers and crackdowns, something Americans became acutely aware of during the Capitol riot and even during the pandemic (when some worried about government overreach). Finally, historical cases like Spain in the 1930s (which descended into civil war amid polarization between leftist and rightist factions) or Latin American coups (often following periods of hyperinflation or social unrest, e.g. Chile 1973) show the grave consequences when polarization and economic crisis peak without effective conflict resolution. The U.S. is not on the verge of such outcomes, but these parallels remind us that even societies that consider themselves stable can break under extreme strain.

Extrapolation: Patterns, Warnings, and the Road Ahead

What do these historical parallels and current trends suggest about the trajectory of the United States? While no forecast is certain, experts and data point to several potential scenarios if underlying issues are not addressed. The patterns observed – polarization, democratic norm erosion, economic grievance, social fragmentation, and distorted information – are commonly associated with democratic decline and sometimes collapse. Political scientists who study democratic breakdown have identified warning signs that apply to the U.S. case. For instance, Barbara F. Walter, an expert on civil conflicts, notes that two key factors predictive of political violence and instability are anocracy (a partial democracy where institutions are weakening) and factionalism (political parties organized around identity that view rivals as enemies) (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy). She and colleagues have pointed out that the U.S. has slid in that direction: by some measures, the U.S. became an “anocracy” in 2020 with a Polity score drop (though it rebounded in 2021) (index), and U.S. parties are increasingly divided along racial, religious, and cultural identity lines – exactly the kind of factionalism that elevates risk (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy). According to Walter’s research (which draws on CIA-developed models for instability), countries in this zone of partial democracy and intense factional polarization are substantially more likely to experience surges in political violence or even civil conflict.

Democracy Indexes and Warnings: Quantitative democracy indexes reinforce these concerns. We’ve noted that the Economist Intelligence Unit has rated the U.S. a flawed democracy since 2016 (The Economist Democracy Index – Wikipedia). Freedom House’s annual score for the U.S. has also declined each year in the past decade (dropping from 94/100 a decade ago to around 83/100 in recent reports, due to issues like gerrymandering, polarization, and unequal voter access) (US sinks to new low in rankings of world’s democracies). Such scores still place the U.S. in the “Free” category, but the downward trend is significant. Internationally, we are in the midst of a “democratic recession” – 2023 marked the 17th consecutive year of overall decline in global freedom, with more countries sliding toward authoritarianism than strengthening democracy. The United States, historically a model democracy, has unfortunately been part of this trend. When America’s own democratic standards visibly slip, it not only affects Americans but can embolden autocrats elsewhere by showing that democracy is fragile everywhere (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). The Brookings Institution, in a 2022 analysis, concluded that “experts agree the health of U.S. democracy has declined in recent years” and pointed to clear symptoms: hyper-partisan hatred of opponents, widespread misinformation, weakening of independent institutions, and executive aggrandizement (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). All these, the report notes, “are present in the United States” today (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). This erosion has ramifications: it corrodes the norms of tolerance and forbearance that allow a diverse democracy to function.

Potential Futures – Reform or Continued Erosion: If the U.S. continues on the current trajectory without meaningful reforms or changes, historical patterns suggest several risks. In a worst-case extrapolation, continued polarization and norm-breaking could lead to a constitutional crisis – for example, a disputed election in which large portions of the population (and perhaps state legislatures or courts) refuse to acknowledge the outcome. We got a preview of this in 2020–21; a repeat with closer margins could plunge the country into a deeper legitimacy crisis. Under such stress, political violence could escalate beyond sporadic incidents. Security experts have warned of the risk of an uptick in domestic terrorism or even insurgency-style violence if extremist groups feel empowered (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy). This would not look like the 19th-century Civil War with armies clashing, but more like the “troubles” seen in other countries – irregular acts of terror, assassinations, and unrest that undermine security (Barbara Walter specifically notes that modern civil wars often manifest as insurgencies and guerrilla attacks, not formal battles (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy)). Already, the FBI and DHS deem violent domestic extremism a top threat; a further normalization of political violence could push America toward something akin to Northern Ireland’s past conflict or Italy’s “Years of Lead” in the 1970s.

Another possibility, short of outright violence, is a steady march into illiberal democracy – where elections continue but become ever less fair, institutional checks are eroded, and minority rights are curtailed. The U.S. could see more aggressive gerrymandering and voter suppression that effectively allow one party to entrench dominance even with minority support (some argue this is already underway at state levels). We might also see increased politicization of the civil service and judiciary to entrench power (for example, scenarios like state legislatures attempting to override popular vote results, or courts consistently siding with one faction). Over time, this could transform American democracy into something more closely resembling countries like Hungary or Turkey, where formal democratic processes exist but the playing field is heavily tilted and opposition voices operate under constant threat. The Polity Project’s latest notation about the U.S. as of mid-2024 is sobering: it describes the U.S. as experiencing a “regime transition,” and if one extrapolated from some worst-case codings (Polity score dropping to 0, indicating anocracy on the cusp of autocracy) (index) (index), the U.S. by that measure would “no longer be considered a democracy” (index). That is an extreme interpretation reflecting a potential future where executive power faces no real constraint and competition is merely factional. While this is not yet reality, it highlights the stakes: the guardrails must hold, or the system can slide into a fundamentally undemocratic form.

On the other hand, historical awareness and civic action could yet alter the course. The attention to Weimar parallels itself indicates that many Americans and leaders are cognizant of the dangers and determined to avoid them. After January 6, 2021, for example, the institutions ultimately prevailed – Congress reconvened and certified the election, and courts and election officials (including many Republicans) had earlier stood firm against baseless fraud claims. This resilience is a point of contrast: Weimar’s institutions (courts, bureaucracy, even the military) were often sympathetic to right-wing extremists and did not strongly resist Nazi incursions early on, whereas key U.S. institutions so far have shown independence (judges rejecting pressure, military staying out of politics, etc. (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America)). That said, resilience once does not guarantee resilience forever. There are ongoing efforts at reform that could bolster democracy – such as initiatives to protect voting rights, reduce extreme gerrymandering, address online disinformation, and perhaps economic measures to reduce inequality. The question is whether these will gain traction in time.

Expert Opinions and Modeling: Many scholars emphasize that the U.S. is at a crossroads. The authors of How Democracies Die warn that the “guardrails of American democracy” – mutual toleration and institutional forbearance – have been weakening, but they are not beyond repair yet (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States). They advocate for all democratic actors to form a united front in defense of rules and norms, much like pro-democracy parties in some European countries have done to keep extremists out of power. Others point to public opinion as a hopeful sign – despite polarization, polls show majorities oppose political violence and support the idea of democracy in principle, suggesting there is a constituency for renewal if leaders can tap into it. Quantitative models (like those used by the CIA’s instability task force) assign probabilities to conflict risk; while exact numbers are classified, Barbara Walter has indicated that on such models the U.S. moved into a higher-risk category comparable to countries that have experienced insurgencies (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy). Even if that risk is, say, a few percentage points, it is dramatically higher than anyone would have expected for the United States two decades ago. The goal of highlighting parallels is not to suggest America is destined to repeat Germany’s fate – “history doesn’t repeat, but it rhymes,” as Mark Twain quipped – rather, it is to learn from those rhymes. The lesson from Weimar, Fascist Italy, and similar episodes is that democracies can decay if citizens, institutions, and elites fail to vigorously defend them. Conversely, the hopeful lesson is that catastrophe is not inevitable; Germany in the 1920s had scant pro-democratic tradition or civil society to fall back on, whereas the U.S. has a much deeper reservoir of democratic norms and a diverse, informed civil society that can mobilize for reform.

Conclusion: In summary, the United States in the last decade exhibits several troubling parallels with pre-WWII Germany: extreme polarization, declining trust in democratic institutions, the rise of extremist rhetoric and nationalism, economic inequality fueling populist anger, social fragmentation and scapegoating of out-groups, and a media landscape permeated by propaganda and misinformation. Other historical and contemporary cases reinforce the warning that these conditions can tilt a nation toward authoritarianism or instability. Yet, the future is not written. America’s democratic institutions – though strained – have shown resilience (for example, courts upholding the rule of law, a free press continuing to operate, and a transfer of power ultimately occurring in 2021 (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America)). The coming years will be crucial. If the U.S. can address the root causes (bridging the partisan divide, renewing civic education, reforming electoral rules for fairness, reducing economic disparities, and restoring trust and truth in media), it may break the pattern and emerge with a healthier democracy. If not, the patterns of history suggest the situation could worsen, potentially leading to democratic breakdown or widespread civil strife. The parallels with Weimar Germany and other fallen democracies serve as both a warning and a call to action – a reminder that democracy is not a static condition but a continuous commitment, one that requires vigilance in the face of the very challenges that have undone nations in the past. As one analysis of Weimar’s lesson for America concluded: “It is fatal for conservatives to think they can play with the fire of right-wing extremism without getting burned.” (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) The preservation of American democracy will likely hinge on the willingness of mainstream leaders and citizens across the spectrum to marginalize the extremists, uphold norms of truth and tolerance, and address the grievances that extremists exploit. History provides the parallels; it is up to the present to plot a different course.

Sources

• Pew Research Center – Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 (June 2024) (Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 | Pew Research Center) (Public Trust in Government: 1958-2024 | Pew Research Center)
• Economist Intelligence Unit – Democracy Index 2016 (via Wikipedia summary) (The Economist Democracy Index – Wikipedia)
• Foreign Policy (Gerwarth, 2021) – “Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America” (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America) (Weimar’s Lessons for Biden’s America)
• Brookings Institution (2022) – “Understanding democratic decline in the United States” (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States)
• PRRI American Values Survey (2023) – Data on belief in 2020 election fraud (PRRI)
• U.S. GAO (2023) – “Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S.” (The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It | U.S. GAO) (The Rising Threat of Domestic Terrorism in the U.S. and Federal Efforts to Combat It | U.S. GAO)
• Wikipedia – “Political violence in Germany (1918–1933)” (citing Weimar-era murder statistics) (Political violence in Germany (1918–1933) – Wikipedia)
• Reuters (Mar 23, 2023) – “U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says” (U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says | Reuters) (U.S. antisemitic incidents hit record high in 2022, ADL report says | Reuters)
• FBI Uniform Crime Reports – Hate Crime Statistics 2020 (via EJI analysis) (FBI Reports Hate Crimes at Highest Level in 12 Years)
• BLS / U.S. Labor Dept – Consumer Price Index news (July 2022) (Consumer prices up 9.1 percent over the year ended June 2022 …)
• The Holocaust Explained (Wiener Library) – Nazi electoral statistics (Electoral success – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools) (Electoral success – The Holocaust Explained: Designed for schools)
• MIT Sloan (Vosoughi et al., 2018 in Science) – “False news spreads faster than the truth” (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan) (Study: False news spreads faster than the truth | MIT Sloan)
• Gallup – Americans’ Trust in Media Remains Low (Oct 2022) (Americans’ Trust in Media Remains at Trend Low – Gallup News)
• Britannica – Biography of Benito Mussolini (rise to power and dictatorship) (Benito Mussolini – Fascism, Italy, WW2 | Britannica)
• Freedom House – Freedom in the World 2022 report (Russia score) (The torn history between Russia and democracy)
• Journal of Democracy (McFaul, 2021) – “Russia’s Road to Autocracy” (Russia’s Road to Autocracy | Journal of Democracy)
• Political Instability Task Force / Polity Project – U.S. Polity score update (2020–21) (index) (index)
• Foreign Policy (FP Live, Aug 2024) – Interview with Barbara F. Walter on civil war risk (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy) (Could Civil War Erupt in America? – Foreign Policy)
• Additional analysis and historical data from the author’s synthesis of academic sources and government reports (Understanding democratic decline in the United States) (Understanding democratic decline in the United States).